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The Dodgson score problem is part of the Dodgson election scheme invented by Charles
Dodgson and presented in [Dod76]. One of the system’s strengths (and motivations for
its study) is that it satisfies the Condorcet criterion (which states that any candidate who
defeats all other candidates in pairwise elections will be declared the winner). It is unfor-
tunate, though, that in a given election no Condorcet winner may exist. Dodgson’s election
system chooses the winner “closest” to being the Condorcet winner in the sense that it
requires the shortest sequence of edits (swapping of adjacent candidates in the voters’ pref-
erence rankings) to the votes in order to make it one. The length of this sequence is known
as the Dodgson score.
The problem of finding the Dodgson score of a candidate is computationally intractable.
Thus an approximation is necessary. This paper puts forth MCDodgsonScore, a polynomial-
time computable (ln(m) + 1)-approximation of that problem. This approximation is op-
timal, meaning that an approximation with an asymptotically tighter error bound does not
exist, as shown in [CCF+09].
MCDodgsonScore builds on a technique introduced by Homan and Hemaspaandra in
[HH06]. A nice feature of MCDodgsonScore is that, when treated as its own voting rule, it
will also satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
v
Contents
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Voting Theory and Dodgson Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Applications of Voting Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Organization of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Social Choice Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Formal Election Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Election System Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 The Condorcet Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Election Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Dodgson Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 Young Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.3 Single Transferable Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.4 Borda Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.5 Maximin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.6 Binary Cup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.7 Copeland’s Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Computational Aspects of Dodgson Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Decision Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.1 Dodgson score decision problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1 Approximation Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
vi
3.2.2 Self-Knowing Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.3 Greedy Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 Computational Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3.1 Polynomial Time Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3.2 NP Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3.3 ΘP2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3.4 C-Hard and C-Complete Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Dodgson and Arrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5 A Brute Force Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.6 NP-hardness of DodgsonWinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6.1 Exact Cover by 3-sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6.2 Defining the Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.6.3 Defining the Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7 Greedily Computing the Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.7.1 GreedyScore and GreedyWinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Marginal Cost Dodgson Election Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 The Marginal Cost Dodgson Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 MCDodgson’s Approximation Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4 MCDodgson and Dodgson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.5 Detail of the Winner and Score Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5 Conclusion and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42




1.1 Voting Theory and Dodgson Elections
Starting with a group of voters who have ranked a group of candidates from most-preferred
to least-preferred, a voting mechanism (also called voting system, or voting rule), is a
method of taking those rankings and mapping them into one ranking (which may contain
ties) for the entire group. There are many haphazard ways to do this, but researchers con-
stantly seek out the voting mechanisms that provide the best representation of the group’s
preferences.
Of particular importance is the problem of finding the candidate that is most preferred,
i.e., the winner. A natural way, proposed by Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis
de Condorcet in [Con85], to choose the winner is to pick the one that defeats all others in
pairwise elections. Winners who satisfy this condition are known as Condorcet winners
and elections that guarantee this behavior are said to satisfy the Condorcet criterion. It is
unfortunate that, due to reasons left to Chapter 2, a voting method cannot be constructed
based on the criterion alone.
To address this, researchers tried to find a way of choosing the candidate closest to
being a Condorcet winner. Two methods for doing this involve making a series of edits in
the votes in order to attain a candidate that is a Condorcet winner. The candidate with the
shortest possible sequence of edits is declared the winner. The first method, proposed by
Young in [You77], deletes votes from the election altogether. A second voting rule, given
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in [Dod76] by Charles Dodgson, defines an edit as a swapping of adjacent candidates in
a single vote. The length of the shortest series of swaps needed to make the candidate a
Condorcet winner is the candidate’s Dodgson score.
Unfortunately, the Dodgson election problem is computationally intractable. Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick, in 1989, found that determining the solution of the decision problem ver-
sion of determining the Dodgson score of a candidate is NP-complete, and that solving the
decision problem version of the winner problem was NP-hard [BTT89b]. Hemaspaandra
et al. improved upon their results, and showed that the winner decision problem is ΘP2 -
complete, i.e., complete for the class of problems solvable in polynomial time with the
allowance for no more than O(log(n)) queries to an NP oracle [HHR97].
Given these complexity results, implementing an exact solution is out of the question,
so researchers began searching for heuristics. Two results leveraged the fact that in most
political settings the number of voters greatly outnumbers the size of the candidate set. One
of these results, put forth by McCabe-Dansted, Pritchard, and Slinko, uses Tideman’s rule
to find heuristically the winner [MDPS06].
In the second result, Homan and Hemaspaandra [HH06] use a heuristic similar to
McCabe-Dansted et al. [MDPS06], but has the added property of being self-knowingly
correct: when the algorithm outputs “definitely” as part of its result, then the score it pro-
vides with it is definitely the Dodgson score.
The MCDodgsonScore algorithm presented in this thesis builds upon the work in Homan
and Hemaspaandra by actually modifying the votes, rather than just passing through them,
but not enough to destroy the polynomial runtime. It also preserves the property of self-
knowing correctness.
1.2 Applications of Voting Theory
Voting theory has several applications in practice. The first and most obvious area is in
politics. The most widely used election mechanism (either as-is or modified) in politics is
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called plurality. This voting rule elects the winner who receives the most first-place votes.
This method of voting is sometimes called “tops-only” (as opposed to preferential) since
it does not consider the position of any other candidate beyond the highest in a voter’s
preference ranking.
More complicated methods can be used in areas, such as artificial intelligence, for, e.g.,
the aggregation of web pages [DKNS01], avoiding spam results in web searches [FKS03],
collaborative filtering [PHG00], and planning in automated multi-agent systems [ER91,
ER93].
Other applications can be found in heating and cooling systems. For instance, The
Golisano College of Computing and Information Science at Rochester Institute of Tech-
nology has one boiler per floor. However, each room may read a different temperature and
it is wasteful for the furnace to stay on when it is not needed, just in case one room wants
heat. Thus each room has its own temperature sensor and when that sensor goes too high
or low from the norm it votes as to whether to turn the furnace on or off. The preferences
of the rooms are polled periodically and the furnace reacts according to the aggregated
preference of the group.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
Chapter 2 of the thesis, Social Choice Preliminaries, will give the reader a mathematical
introduction to election theory and some of the properties an election system can have and
criteria it can satisfy.
Chapter 3 will go more deeply into the study of Dodgson elections, discussing the
algorithmic and mathematical tools used to study them, and walking through a famous
reduction involving Dodgson election related problems. This chapter will also discuss the
GreedyWinner algorithm developed in [HH06] (since a proposed improvement will be
detailed in Chapter 4). The GreedyWinner algorithm is a heuristic to the question: given a
candidate and an election, is this candidate the winner?
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Chapter 4 will give an algorithm that extends the GreedyScore algorithm as well as
prove theorems associated with it, such as the polynomial runtime and the approximation
bound. Chapter 4 will also show that when GreedyScore outputs a definitely correct an-
swer, so does our algorithm.





This chapter will give the reader an overview of the mathematical and computational theory
behind Dodgson elections. First we will define the formal model of an election and then
discuss specific voting mechanisms. Later, we will define some terms and notions from
computational complexity theory that are useful in studying elections.
2.1 Formal Election Model
An election system has two main inputs: a set C containing m candidates, and a collection
(multiset) V holding n votes. Note that V is not a set since it can contain more than one
copy of the same vote (i.e., two or more people vote the same way). Since V is a multiset
it is helpful to define some notation over multisets rather than sets. Given a vote v ∈ V , the
collection V − {v} means the collection V minus exactly one instance of the vote v. The
collection V ∪ {v} means the collection V with exactly one additional instance of the vote
v added into it.
A vote is a total ordering of the candidates. Let C = {c1, c2, c3, · · · , cn}. Then a valid
vote is denoted (cb1  cb2  cb3  · · ·  cbn) where each bi is distinct and 1 ≤ bi ≤ n.
We use the symbol c  d to denote that candidate c is immediately preferred candidate d
in the ranking (they are adjacent). We use the symbol c >v d to denote that candidate c is
preferred over candidate d in vote v, but c may or may not be adjacent to d. The symbol
c v d denotes that candidate c is preferred over candidate d in vote v, and c is adjacent to
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d in the vote.
Let L(C) be the set of all possible votes for candidates in C, then a preference profile
may be seen as an n-tuple in L(C)n. More simply put a preference profile is a collection
of the voters’ rankings of the candidates. For a given preference profile 〈1, . . . ,n〉 ∈
L(C)n, i ∈ V , and c ∈ C, let c(>i) denote ||{d ∈ C | c >i d}||, or the number of
candidates which c defeats in the ith vote. This is the same as the position of the candidate
in the vote.
An election system is a preference profile together with a voting rule (also called voting
method or voting mechanism). When we input the preference profile to an algorithm which
computes a voting rule, the algorithm’s output is a ranking of the candidates from most
preferred to least preferred, and there may be ties between them. The first-place candidates
are known as the winners.
2.2 Election System Criteria
This section presents criteria that one can use to evaluate an election system. The criteria
presented here are the Condorcet criertion and the criteria studied by Arrow.
2.2.1 The Condorcet Criterion
The Condorcet criterion examines the relationship between one candidate and the others
when compared in pairwise elections. A pairwise election is one that involves only two
candidates. We consider the positions of each of the two candidates in each vote. The
candidate who is ranked higher in the most number of the votes is the winner of the pairwise
election.
This criterion is simple and states that a candidate who, when compared pairwise
against each other candidate, defeats them all by a strict majority, should be declared the
winner [Con85]. Any voting method which holds true to this principle is said to be a Con-
dorcet method. This criterion seems like a logical one that every voting method should
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satisfy. But not every voting method, even those widely used today, does so. It is a known
folklore result that the plurality voting rule is not a Condorcet method and it is quite simple
to show this with a counterexample.
Theorem 1. Plurality is not a Condorcet method
Proof. Plurality is a simple voting method in which the candidate ranked first by the most
voters wins. Its simplicity makes it widely used in politics. Consider an election with 50
voters where C = {Bush,Kerry,Nader} and V = {20 of (Bush  Kerry  Nader), 15 of
(Kerry  Bush  Nader), and 15 of (Nader  Kerry  Bush)}. The plurality mechanism
assigns a score of 20 to Bush, 15 to Kerry, and 15 to Nader. Bush is therefore declared the
winner.
If we compare each candidate pairwise we will see that Kerry  Bush 30-to-20 and
Kerry  Nader 35-to-15. Kerry is clearly the Condorcet winner. Since the plurality mech-
anism did not output Kerry as the winner, it fails to be a Condorcet method.
Using the Condorcet criterion alone to construct a voting mechanism sounds tempting.
It would be easy to just compare each pair of candidates and find the one that pairwise
defeats all the others. However, there may not always be a Condorcet winner in the election
and therefore we cannot use it as an election method.
For instance, consider an election where a, b, c ∈ C and V = {(a  b  c), (b  c 
a), (c  a  b)}. There is no Condorcet winner. It can easily be seen that each candidate
is beaten by one of the other two. Therefore no candidate can be declared a winner! This
condition is known as Condorcet’s paradox.
2.2.2 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [Arr63] puts forth five axioms and states that no election
system can satisfy all five of them at the same time.
1. Non-dictatorship: The voting rule cannot simply output the ranking of a single voter
and must take the preferences of multiple voters into consideration.
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2. Unrestricted domain: The voting rule must consider the preferences of all voters
in the election when determining the output ranking and it must produce the same
ranking every time the election is run on the same votes (no randomness is allowed).
3. Monotonicity: If a candidate has a specific position in the output ranking, then pro-
moting that candidate in any individual vote or votes should not make that candidate
have a lower position in the output ranking.
4. Non-imposition: The voting rule is a surjection, meaning that for every possible
output ranking there is some input preference profile which results in it.
5. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): Given the output ranking of an election,
if we introduce a new candidate to the election the rankings of the old candidates,
with respect to each other, should remain the same.
Arrow’s theorem holds only if the voters cast their votes independently, without knowl-
edge of each other’s votes. If voters actually collaborate to make sure there are no cyclical
majorities (i.e., the votes are no longer independent), then a voting system can be con-
structed which satisfies all of Arrow’s axioms [CT65]. In particular people have consid-
ered restricting the preference profiles that are admissible as input to a voting rule. In these
cases we lose the unrestricted domain criterion, but can gain another criterion in the pro-
cess. For instance, the Dodgson election system does not satisfy the IIA criterion, but we
can consider only preference profiles put through the mechanism which would exhibit the
behavior of IIA.
Definition 2. Given an election system E, let EIIA be the set of preference profiles of E
where the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion is satisfied. A specific instance
of EIIA is created with n candidates and has a total order of the candidates as an output. If
one or more of those candidates is removed and the election run again then the new output
of the election should be identical to the first output less the removed candidate. In other
words, removing a single candidate, or arbitrary numbers of candidates for that matter,
does not affect the outcome of the election with respect to the remaining candidates.
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2.3 Election Systems
Although the focus of this paper is on Dodgson elections, it is worthy to note that there are
many distinct election systems studied by researchers. They vary widely in terms of rules
and mechanisms, and complexity and fairness. This section defines both Dodgson elections
and some other widely studied systems.
As stated earlier, there are many opinions as to what constitutes a fair election. There-
fore, many rules have turned up. Among the simplest of these rules is the plurality election.
There are also rules defined in terms of other rules, such as the hybrid elections studied in
[EL06]. For each system considered, we will show how it works on the following example:
three candidates, C = {a, b, c}, and fifty votes, V = {20 of (a  b  c), 15 of (b  a 
c), 15 of (c  b  a)}.
2.3.1 Dodgson Elections
The Dodgson election system is based on the Condorcet criterion and tries to find the
candidate closest to being the Condorcet winner. For every candidate, the method computes
the Dodgson score of that candidate. The candidate(s) with the smallest Dodgson score are
declared the winner(s). The Dodgson score of a candidate is the shortest sequence of edits
that need to be made to the collection of votes in order for that candidate to become the
Condorcet winner. Finally, an edit is one swap of two adjacent candidates in the preference
ranking of one vote.
In particular, for any vote v and any c, d ∈ C, if c v d, let Swapc,d(v) denote the vote
v′, where v′ is the same total ordering of C as v except that now d v′ c. If c is not adjacent
to d then Swapc,d(v) is undefined. In effect, a swap causes c and d to switch places, but
only if c and d are adjacent.
In our example, the Dodgson score of b is 0. This is because b defeats both a (30-to-20)
and c (35-to-15) in pairwise elections. Since b defeats all other candidates in a pairwise
election that makes b the Condorcet winner. Condorcet winners always have a Dodgson
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score of 0 and will be output as one of the winners in this mechanism. This makes the
system a Condorcet method.
The Dodgson score of a is 6. Candidate a already defeats c and therefore needs no
improvement against it; however, it loses to b by 10 votes. We have swaps between a and b
that will improve b’s score available to us in votes of the form (b  a  c). If we change
six of these votes, a will defeat b by one vote, making it the Condorcet winner.
The Dodgson score of c is 22. Candidate c loses to both b and a by 20 votes each
but we can follow roughly the same procedure we used to calculate the score of a. We
need to make 11 swaps between b and c and 11 swaps between a and c for c to become
the Condorcet winner. These swaps are available in votes of the form (b  a  c) and
(c  b  a).
2.3.2 Young Elections
The Young Election [You77] is similar to Dodgson elections in that it also elects the can-
didate closest to the Condorcet winner. The definition of “closest” in a Young election is
different, though. In this system if a vote hurts a candidate, then the vote is dropped from
the election completely. The candidate who needs the least number of votes dropped to be
declared the Condorcet winner is the winner of the Young election.
The Young score of b is 0, since b defeats a and c already. The Young election is, like
the Dodgson election, a Condorcet method.
Candidate a has a Young score of 6. If we drop six votes of the form (c  b  a) then
a will defeat b by one vote. Dropping of these particular votes has no effect on the pairwise
election of a and c.
The Young score of c is 11. 11 votes of the form (a  b  c) should be dropped and
this will simultaneously cause c to gain against both b and a.
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2.3.3 Single Transferable Vote
Single transferable vote [BO91] is a widely used voting rule (elections in Ireland, the Aus-
tralian senate, and local elections in Scotland, to name a few, use it). The goal of the rule
is to minimize the number of votes that are wasted, by transferring them from weaker can-
didates to stronger ones. The rule takes a quota and a number of desired winners (i.e.,
available seats) as part of its input. It may be possible for the rule to produce more winners
than seats depending on the quota used, therefore care must be taken to avoid to avoid this
possibility when choosing the quota.
Single transferable vote must have a set quota, q, to function properly. The quota q
is most commonly set to ( # of votes# of seats+1) + 1. This is called the Droop quota. The voting
rule works in several steps that repeat as many times as needed until all seats are filled.
Any candidate who has been ranked first in a number of votes greater than or equal to q
is declared a winner. Second, we check to see if the required number of seats had been
filled, if yes, then the algorithm terminates, if no, then we check to see if there have been
any previous winners declared. If previous winners have been declared, and the number of
votes where they are ranked first is greater than q, then those votes are given to the next-
choice candidates, i.e., each vote for a winning candidate is transferred to other candidates
according to the next preference in the voter’s ranking. If no one still has more than q first-
place, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and his votes are transferred
to the next-choice candidates. The process repeats until all seats are filled.
In our example, the Droop quota would be ( # of votes# of seats+1) + 1 = (
50
1+1
) + 1 = 26. No
candidate has 26 votes, so we must eliminate the candidates with the fewest first=placed
votes. In this case it is both b and c. This leaves only a as the declared winner with b
and c tied for last. Single Transferrable Vote is not a Condorcet method and our example
provides a proof of this by counter-example.
If we had two seats to fill instead of just one, we can change the quota to be ( # of votes# of seats+1)+
1 = ( 50
2+1
) + 1 = 18 (rounding up to the next whole vote). Candidate a surpasses this quota
with 20 votes and is immediately elected. The other two candidates have 15 votes each.
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Since a only needed 18 to win, the remaining two votes are transferred to b, who is the
second preferred candidate in these surplus votes. This gives b a score of 17 and c a score
of 15. Since neither b or cmeet the quota, the candidate with the lowest score, c, is dropped.
This leaves only b to get the second seat.
2.3.4 Borda Count
The Borda Count [dB81] is a simple election system that computes a score for each can-
didate and the candidate with the greatest score wins. Given m candidates, we go through
the votes and for each vote the candidate adds m − 1 to his score if he is the voter’s top
choice, m − 2 if he is the voter’s second choice, and so on, so that he adds nothing to his
score if he is last.
It is named for Jean-Charles de Borda, who created the system in 1770. The Borda
system is currently being used by the National Assembly of Slovenia, among other organi-
zations and countries.
Using our example, votes of the form (a  b  c), c would get 0 points, b would get 1
point, and a would get 2. In votes of the form (b  a  c), c gets 0 points, a gets 1 point,
and b gets 2 points. In votes of the form (c  b  a), c gets 2 points, b gets 1 point, and
a gets 0 points. This gives c a total of 30 points, b a total of 65, and a a total of 55. The
system would declare b the winner, followed by a in second place, and c in last.
2.3.5 Maximin
Maximin (see [EL06]), like Borda, computes a score for each candidate. A candidate’s
score in a pairwise election is the number of voters that prefer it over the opponent. A can-
didates number of points is the lowest score it gets in any pairwise election. The candidate
with the highest score wins.
In our example, candidate a defeats c by 20, candidate b defeats a by 10, and c by 20.
Candidate c defeats noone. Thus the scores of a, b, and c, are, respectively, 20, 10 and 0,
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therefore a is elected the winner. Our examples provides a proof by counterexample that
Maximin is not a Condorcet method since b was not elected as winner.
2.3.6 Binary Cup
The winner of the Binary Cup (see [EL06]) is determined by a tournament. The election
consists of dlogme rounds where each candidate is paired up against another. The way
candidates are seeded against each other in the tournament is usually an input to the algo-
rithm that will determine the winner. If there are an odd number of candidates, one of them
gets a bye to the next round. The winning candidates in each round then advance to the
next. The actual tournament schedule can be given to the system as a parameter.
For our example, in the first round, we let candidate a go against c and give b a bye to the
next round since it is in the lead. Candidate a defeats c in a pairwise election and therefore
moves on to go against b. b defeats a and is therefore declared the winner. If we modified
the tournament to give c the bye, then b would still win, so that makes no difference in this
case. There may be, however, instances of elections where the positioning of byes would
affect the outcome of the election.
2.3.7 Copeland’s Method
The candidates of an election using Copeland’s method (see [BTT89a]) are scored based on
victories and defeats in pairwise elections. For each pairwise victory the candidate receives
one point, and for each defeat the candidate loses one point. The candidate with the most
points wins.
Candidate b defeats both a and c and thus has 2 points. Candidate a defeats c and gets




Computational Aspects of Dodgson Elec-
tions
This chapter will discuss the wide range of work that has been done by computer scientists
on Dodgson elections. Computer scientists have sought a good approximation, among other
things, for the Dodgson election because of its relationship with the Condorcet criterion.
3.1 Decision Problems
A decision problem is a question with given inputs that yields a yes or no answer only. It
is this class of problems that the major complexity classes P and NP are defined. Decision
problems are often defined in two parts, an instance and a question. An instance can be
made up of sets, graphs, functions, numbers, etc. and the second part, the question, asks a
yes or no question about the instance.
3.1.1 Dodgson score decision problems
Two decision problems related to the Dodgson election problem are the score and winner
problems. The score problem determines the score for each candidate. The winner problem
returns yes if the input candidate is the winner of the election.
Decision Problem: DodgsonScore
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Instance: A set C of candidates, a multiset V of votes, c ∈ C and a positive integer k.
Question Is Score(C, V, c), the Dodgson score of candidate c in the election specified by
(C, V ), less than or equal to k?
Decision Problem: DodgsonWinner
Input: A set C of candidates, a multiset V of votes, c ∈ C.
Question: Is c a winner of the election? That is, does c tie-or-defeat all other candidates in
the election?
3.2 Algorithms
An algorithm, simply put, is a means to an end. It is a set of well-defined instructions that
achieve some goal. Algorithms can be classified according to the techniques they use to get
from input to output (such as greedy or probabilistic algorithms) or they can be classified
based on output constraints (such as approximation algorithms). The algorithm presented
in chapter 4 is both a greedy algorithm and an approximation algorithm.
3.2.1 Approximation Algorithms
Given an optimization problem (i.e., one that minimizes or maximizes some value) in which
each potential solution has a positive cost, we may wish to seek a near-optimal solution due
to the time or space necessary to find the optimal solution being too great. We say that an
algorithm is a p(n)-approximation of an optimization problem where p(n) is called the
approximation ratio on input of size n. This ratio means that the cost of the near-optimal
solution is within a factor of p(n) of the optimal solution [CLRS01].
For example, let P be an instance of a problem which takes input x. For this instance,
assume |x| = 2 and the optimal solution is 20. Let algorithm A be a ln(|x|)-approximation
of problem P . Algorithm A on input x is guaranteed to output an answer that is within the
range of 20± (20)(ln(2)).
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The decision problem DodgsonScore is a minimization problem since it seeks the
shortest number of adjacent swaps that will make the candidate a Condorcet winner, and
thus we can talk about algorithms that approximate it.
The whole purpose of studying approximation algorithms and properties of them is to
try to circumvent the amount of effort in terms of time or space complexity one might need
to solve a problem.
3.2.2 Self-Knowing Correctness
An algorithm can have the property of self-knowing correctness. For sets S and T and
function f : S → T , an algorithm A : S → T × {“definitely”, “maybe”} is self-knowingly
correct for f if, for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T , whenever A on input s outputs (t, “definitely”) it
holds that f(s) = t.
3.2.3 Greedy Algorithms
A greedy algorithm takes the best choice at any given moment. It makes locally optimal
choices that sometimes yield the globally optimal decision. Greedy algorithms can be
used to find exact solutions for some problems and can be used to create approximation
algorithms for more complex problems.
Greedy algorithms have the greedy-choice property [CLRS01]. This property says that
the globally optimum solution can be arrived at by making locally optimal choices. In
order for this property to be satisfied the problem must have an optimal substructure, or
a structure which allows it to be broken up into smaller pieces that will allow us to reach
the correct answer. For a greedy algorithm that outputs an exact solution, this substructure
must lead us to it. For one that gives us an approximation, this substructure must allow us
to get an answer within some upper bound of the exact solution.
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3.3 Computational Complexity
The study of computational complexity deals with the running time of algorithms in terms
of the length of their inputs. This section gives a general definition of some of the com-
plexity classes used in this thesis, for more detail on the concepts of P, NP, NP-hard, and
NP-complete, see [GJ79] or [BC93].
3.3.1 Polynomial Time Problems
Let D be a decision problem, x its input and |x| is the length of its its input. If there exists
an algorithm A such that A solves D and the running time of A is O(f(|x|)) where f is a
polynomial function, then D is in P, or the class of polynomial-time computable problems.
3.3.2 NP Problems
NP is the class of decision problems that are solvable by an algorithm that runs in nondeter-
ministic polynomial time. Nondeterminism is the ability of an algorithm to have multiple
paths of execution, and guess which path to follow until it arrives at the correct solution. NP
can also be described as the class of problems where a solution can be verified in polyno-
mial time (i.e., if we have an output we can check to see if that output is the correct answer
in polynomial time). It is clear that P ⊆ NP, but the converse remains an open problem in
complexity theory.
3.3.3 ΘP2
ΘP2 is the class of decision problems solvable in polynomial-time with the added benefit
of being able to make O(log(n)) (where n is the length of the problem’s input) calls to an
NP-oracle. An oracle is described as a black box that “magically” knows the answer to its
question instantaneously (i.e., as if it ran in constant time).
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3.3.4 C-Hard and C-Complete Problems
For complexity class C, a problem is said to be C-hard if it is at least as hard as all other
C-complete problems. The easiest way to prove an algorithm is C-hard is to perform a
polynomial-time many-one reduction to a problem already known to be C-complete (this
covers all other C-complete problems by transitivity). A polynomial-time many-one reduc-
tion is a mapping from one problem to another. The mapping must be able to be performed
in polynomial time. As an example, the reader can refer to Section 3.6 which illustrates a
reduction for the DodgsonWinner problem.
A C-complete problem is a problem that is C-hard and is also in the class C. Two
problems known to be ΘP2 -complete include DodgsonWinner [HHR97], as defined earlier,
and determining the winners of Young elections [RSV03].
3.4 Dodgson and Arrow
Dodgson elections fail to satisfy Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.
The following theorem presents a proof of this by counterexample.
Theorem 3. Dodgson elections do not satisfy IIA.
Proof. Consider the election where C = {a, b, c} and V = {18 of (b  a  c), 20 of
(a  c  b)}. The Dodgson scores of a, b, and c are 0, 4, and 19, respectively, making
the preference order output by the election (a  b  c). Let us now remove the Condorcet
winner a to get the election defined by Ĉ = {a, b, c} and V̂ = {18 of (b  c), 20 of
(c  b)}. In the results of this new election, (c  b), which deviates from the results of the
original. Therefore Dodgson elections do not satisfy IIA.
If we restrict our instances of DodgsonIIA (see Chapter 2), then there is a polynomial
time algorithm that we can use to find whether or not a particular candidate is a Dodgson
winner.
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Theorem 4. There is a polynomial time algorithm for DodgsonWinner if the input is re-
stricted to instances of DodgsonIIA
Proof. The DodgsonWinner problem, when guaranteed to be restricted to instances of
DodgsonIIA, can be solved in polynomial time via the following algorithm.
DodgsonWinner(C, V, c)
1  C is the set of candidates.
2  V is the list of votes.
3  c ∈ C is the candidate which is being decided on as the winner or not
4 for x ∈ C−{c}
5 do V̂ ← RemoveIA(V, {c, x})
6 if IsMajorityWinner({c, x}, V̂ , x)
7 then return false
8 return true
The function RemoveIA modifies the votes in its first argument by removing any candi-
dates not present in its second argument, the irrelevant alternatives. The function
IsMajorityWinner takes two candidates, a set of votes, and determines which candidate
defeats the other in that contest. These functions are clearly computable in polynomial time
since the number of candidates is fixed.
As a side note, this algorithm would work for any other IIA-satisfying election system.
3.5 A Brute Force Algorithm
The following algorithm solves the Dodgson election problem using an exhaustive search
for the solution. This algorithm has an exponential running time. It works by first finding
every possible sequence of adjacent swaps that would make c a Condorcet winner, and then
by returning the length of the shortest sequence. Some shortcutting is done by only making
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swaps that will improve c against some other candidate which defeats him, thus a sequence
of more than one adjacent swap may be performed in each iteration.
The main algorithm, DodgsonScore, determines the candidates in C which defeat c in
pairwise elections using the Pairwise algorithm. These are the candidates c must advance
against. Then, after determining this, it iterates through the votes and determines, for each
vote, the length of all possible swap sequences in a particular vote between c and some
candidate which defeats it. After building this data set, it calls the FindMinimumScore
algorithm.
The FindMinimumScore algorithm recursively tries all possible swap sequences that
were built earlier. It tallies the total length of these sequences and eventually returns the
length of the shortest sequence.
Condorcet is a trivial algorithm not spelled out in detail here. It takes in candidates C,




1  C is the set of candidates.
2  V is the list of votes.
3  c ∈ C is the candidate whose score the algorithm computes.
4 D ← ∅
5 for (each d ∈ C−{c})
6 do if Pairwise(C, V, d, c) > dn
2
e
7 then D ← D ∪ {d}
8 for each vote v ∈ V
9 do posSwaps [v]← ∅
10 for (each d ∈ D)
11 do swapnum← max(0, Position(d, v)− Position(c, v))
12 if swapnum > 0
13 then posSwaps [v]← posSwaps [v] ∪ {swapnum}
14 return FindMinimumScore(C, V, c, posSwaps)
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FindMinimumScore(C, V, c, posSwaps)
1 if Condorcet(C, V, c)
2 then return 0
3 foundvote← false
4 for (each v ∈ V )
5 do if ‖posSwaps [v]‖ > 0 and ¬foundvote
6 then curvote← v
7 foundvote← true
8 else newPosSwaps [v]← posSwaps [v]
9 minscore←∞
10 if foundvote
11 then for (each s ∈ posSwaps [curvote])
12 do V̂ ← (V−{curvote}) ∪ Swap(c, s,curvote)
13 newscore← s+ FindMinimumScore(C, V̂ , c, newPosSwaps)
14 minscore← min(newscore, minscore)
15 return minscore
Pairwise(C, V, c, d)
1 winningvotes← 0
2 for (each v ∈ V )
3 do if Position(c) > Position(d)




1  Each vote v is treated as an array where v[1] is the least
2  preferred candidate, v[2] is the second least preferred candidate, and so
3  on, and v[length[v]] is the most preferred candidate.
4 i← 1
5 while (i ≤ length[v])
6 do if v[i] = c
7 return i
3.6 NP-hardness of DodgsonWinner
The proof that DodgsonWinner is NP-hard was given in [BTT89b] by constructing a
polynomial-time many-one reduction from the problem exact cover by 3-sets. This prob-
lem is known to be NP-hard [GJ79]. An instance of the problem is presented here as an
example, and the reduction given in [BTT89b] is listed as an example.
3.6.1 Exact Cover by 3-sets
Instance: Set B with ‖B‖ = 3q and a collection S of 3-element subsets of B.
Question: Does S contain an exact cover for B? In other words, does there exist a
subcollection S ′ of S such that every element of B occurs in exactly one member of S ′?
Example of X3C
Let B = {a, b, c, d, e, f} and S contains 3-element subsets of B, or
S ⊆ {
{a, b, c}, {a, b, d}, {a, b, e}, {a, b, f},
{a, c, d}, {a, c, e}, {a, c, f}, {a, d, e},
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{a, d, f}, {a, e, f}, {b, c, d}, {b, c, e},
{b, c, f}, {b, d, e}, {b, d, f}, {b, e, f},
{c, d, e}, {c, d, f}, {c, e, f}, {d, e, f}
}
The problem would answer “yes” if S were to contain any one of the following sets as
a subset, and not otherwise.
1. {{a, b, c}, {d, e, f}}
2. {{a, b, d}, {c, e, f}}
3. {{a, b, e}, {c, d, f}}
4. {{a, b, f}, {c, e, f}}
5. {{a, c, d}, {b, e, f}}
6. {{a, c, e}, {b, d, f}}
7. {{a, c, f}, {b, d, e}}
8. {{a, d, e}, {b, c, f}}
9. {{a, d, f}, {b, c, e}}
10. {{a, e, f}, {b, c, d}}
3.6.2 Defining the Candidates
We start with an instance of X3C having a set B and a collection S of 3-subsets of B.
The set C of candidates is created by adding two candidates for every element in B. A
candidate will also be added for every element in the collection S. A special candidate,
called the target candidate, and the candidate that we are trying to find the Dodgson score
of, is also making the final number of candidates 2‖B‖+ ‖S‖+ 1.
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3.6.3 Defining the Voters
The set of voters V is made up of three subsets: swing voters, equalizing voters, and
incremental voters. The swing voters are built based on the set S ′ and are how an instance
of X3C is transformed into an instance of Dodgson winner. The votes are constructed in
such a way that forces all adjacent swaps that will yield the Dodgson score of the target
candidate to be made in the swing votes.
The Reduction in Action
Let B = a, b, c, d, e, f and S = {s1 = {a, b, c}, s2 = {b, d, e}, s3 = {c, e, f}, s4 =
{d, e, f}}. First we need to create the set of candidates C. We will add two candidates for
each member of B, one candidate for each member of the set S and our target candidate t
making
C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, â, b̂, ĉ, d̂, ê, f̂ , s1, s2, s3, s4, t}.
Now we will create swing voters, Vs, with one vote for each member of S. The set
Vs will contain the following four votes. Note that the first three candidates of each vote
correspond to the elements of the sets in S.
1. (a  b  c  s1  t  d  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s2  s3  s4)
2. (b  d  e  s2  t  a  c  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s2  s3  s4)
3. (c  e  f  s3  t  a  b  d  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s2  s3  s4)
4. (d  e  f  s4  t  a  b  c  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s2  s3  s4)
In the following table, each candidate is given with the number of votes in Vs that it
defeats candidate t in.
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candidate votes candidate votes candidate votes candidate votes
a 1 e 3 ĉ 0 s1 1
b 2 f 2 d̂ 0 s2 1
c 2 â 0 ê 0 s3 1
d 2 b̂ 0 f̂ 0 s4 1
Next we will have to create the equalizing voters, Ve using the above table. The maxi-
mum number of votes any candidate from B has over t is 3 in this example. Given that, the
votes of the set Ve when constructed are
1. (a  â  t  b  c  d  e  f  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s1  s2  s3  s4)
2. (a  â  t  b  c  d  e  f  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s1  s2  s3  s4)
3. (b  b̂  t  a  c  d  e  f  â  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s1  s2  s3  s4)
4. (c  ĉ  t  a  b  d  e  f  â  b̂  d̂  ê  f̂  s1  s2  s3  s4)
5. (d  d̂  t  a  b  c  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  ê  f̂  s1  s2  s3  s4)
6. (f  f̂  t  a  b  c  d  e  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  s1  s2  s3  s4)
We will now re-compute the results of the pairwise elections against t using Vs ∪ Ve.
candidate votes candidate votes candidate votes candidate votes
a 3 e 3 ĉ 1 s1 1
b 3 f 3 d̂ 1 s2 1
c 3 â 2 ê 0 s3 1
d 3 b̂ 1 f̂ 1 s4 1
The last set of votes are called incremental votes and will be placed in the set Vi. Their
purpose is to make each candidate from B defeat t by exactly one vote. Currently, t defeats
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all members of B 7-to-3 and therefore five incremental votes will be added making all five
members of B defeat t 8-to-7. These votes will be
1. (a  b  c  d  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  t  s1  s2  s3  s4)
2. (a  b  c  d  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  t  s1  s2  s3  s4)
3. (a  b  c  d  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  t  s1  s2  s3  s4)
4. (a  b  c  d  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  t  s1  s2  s3  s4)
5. (a  b  c  d  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  t  s1  s2  s3  s4)
Now we can set the votes of this election: V = Vs ∪ Ve ∪ Vi. The final tabulation of
pairwise elections versus candidate t is given in the following table.
candidate votes candidate votes candidate votes candidate votes
a 8 e 8 ĉ 6 s1 1
b 8 f 8 d̂ 6 s2 1
c 8 â 7 ê 5 s3 1
d 8 b̂ 6 f̂ 6 s4 1
Now that the election system is complete we will set the integer k, defined in the Dodg-
son score decision problem, to be 4‖B‖
3
, or, in this case, 8. For the reduction to be valid, we
must be able to use the instance of X3C to solve the instance of DodgsonScore and vice
versa.
To find out whether the Dodgson score of t is less than or equal to 8 we will need to
solve X3C on inputs B and S. We are forced to perform all switches using the swing votes.
If t were to use a swing vote it must make 4 switches in order to defeat every candidate,
therefore, the 4 switches need to be made, in this example, in exactly 2 of the swing votes.
The reader will recall that each swing vote corresponds to a member of the collection S.
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The members of the exact 3-cover of B using S will correspond to the votes where the
switches need to be made. In this example S ′ = {{a, b, c}, {d, e, f}} and therefore the two
votes that need to have switches made are
1. (a  b  c  s1  t  d  e  f  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s2  s3  s4)
2. (d  e  f  s4  t  a  b  c  â  b̂  ĉ  d̂  ê  f̂  s2  s3  s4)
To go the other way we would solve the DodgsonScore problem but along the way
track the votes in which we made adjacent swaps. These votes correspond to the sets in S
which would solve the instance of X3C.
It is this section which inspired the algorithm found in chapter 4. The reader can see
from the reduction that a greedy swap is never available between the target candidate and
candidates that defeat him. It is the investigation of the availability, or lack thereof, these
swaps which are the basis of the our approximation algorithm.
3.7 Greedily Computing the Score
Most of the difficulty of computing the Dodgson winner comes from the immense amount
of backtracking required. Since it is a minimization problem (find the minimum number
of swaps required), all possible ways of swapping a candidate with its adjacent alternatives
must be tried in every single vote (unless of course, the candidate is a Condorcet winner).
Homan and Hemaspaandra found that a good heuristic can be obtained by halting the back-
tracking altogether and just take swaps that are known to help the candidate in question.
Further, their algorithm was frequently correct at calculating the exact Dodgson score. In
order to prove that the algorithm they developed, called GreedyWinner, was frequently
correct they introduced the notion of self-knowing correctness.
The reader may recall from section 3.2.1 that a self-knowingly correct algorithm A′ of
a problem X is one that, along with the result, also gives, what is called, confidence level
from the set {definitely ,maybe}. If the confidence level is definitely then the output of A′
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is also the correct answer. If the confidence level is maybe then the output of A′ may or
may not be correct.
In GreedWinner the confidence level depends on the confidence level of each GreedyScore
computation completed. The confidence level of each GreedyScore computation is de-
pends on the notion of a vote deficit. The deficit of a voter c from voter d is the maximum
of zero or the number of times d defeats c in a pairwise election minus the number of times
c defeats d in a pairwise election. If the deficit of c and every voter in C − {c} is 0, then c
is the Condorcet winner.
The algorithm is simple. It iterates through all the votes and determines for each candi-
date other than c the number of votes in which c has a greedy swap available with them. No
swaps are actually made and only one pass through the votes is done. If for each candidate
other than c there are enough greedy swaps available to overtake the deficit between the
candidate and c then the deficit is the Dodgson score and the algorithm yields a confidence
of definitely , otherwise, the total deficit is returned with a confidence of maybe.
3.7.1 GreedyScore and GreedyWinner
It was shown in [HH06] that the GreedyScore algorithm is not only fast and self-knowingly
correct, but also very frequently correct when the voters greatly outnumber the candidates.
The algorithm outputs maybe less than 2(m2−m)e
−n
8m2 of the time over a uniform distribu-
tion of election systems, wherem is the number of candidates and n is the number of votes.
The probability of the algorithm outputting maybe shrinks asymptotically as we increase
the number of voters over the number of candidates.
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Chapter 4
Marginal Cost Dodgson Election Algo-
rithms
Marginal Cost Dodgson is an algorithm which approximates the Dodgson score of a candi-
date. It builds upon the techniques used by GreedyScore and is itself a greedy algorithm.
The algorithm also retains the self-knowingly correct property. The algorithm works by,
for each vote, computing the most efficient swap, or the swap with the least marginal cost
associated with it. This swap is the one that will yield the highest deficit reduction for
the number of swaps taken. After computing the marginal cost for each swap, the algo-
rithm then makes the swap with the highest efficiency. The marginal costs and swaps will
then be recalculated using the altered preference profile and this process continues until the
candidate is the Condorcet winner.
4.1 Building Blocks
The foundation of this algorithm lies in two things: deficits and edits. A deficit is defined
as the number of votes candidate a needs over candidate b in order for a to defeat b in a
pairwise election. An edit is a swap, or the exchanging of places between two adjacent
candidates in a vote. We define the two terms more formally below.
Definition 5. For every pair of distinct candidates c, d ∈ C and every preference profile
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P = 〈>1, . . . , >n〉, c’s vote deficit in P with d is Deficit(P, c, d) = max{0, ||{i ∈ V | d >i





Thus c is a Condorcet winner if and only if Deficit(P, c) = 0.
Deficit(P, c) is sometimes known as the Tideman score [Tid87], which forms the basis
of the Tideman (a.k.a. ranked pairs) voting rule.




i=0 L(C)i. Let P ◦ e denote the
application of e to some preference profile P . A sequence of edits 〈e1, . . . , ep〉 is called a
Condorcet sequence if Deficit(P ◦ e1 ◦ · · · ◦ ep, c) = 0
A swap is an edit, designated by an ordered pair (i, j) ∈ N2, that takes a preference
profile P = 〈>1, . . . , >n〉 and outputs 〈>′1, . . . , >′n〉, which is just like P except that, if
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 < j < m, then for c, d ∈ C satisfying d(>i) = j = c(>i) + 1 it holds
that c(>′i) = j = d(>
′
i) + 1. This implies that c, d are adjacent in both rankings, d >i c,
and c >′i d. Candidates c and d are said to be involved in the swap.
Now that we have defined both deficits and edits formally, we can define a mechanism
to reduce the deficit. The very heart of the Dodgson election system is to find the sequence
of edits that makes the target candidate a Condorcet winner and is minimal. Therefore we
only make swaps that reduce the deficit against other candidates so maximal efficiency is
obtained, if not the exact solution itself.
Definition 7. A deficit reduction is a 4-tuple (P, c, e, d) where P is a preference profile,
c and d are candidates, and e is an edit such that Deficit(P, c, d) > Deficit(P ◦ e, c, d).
The full sequence of deficit reductions with respect to candidate c over a sequence of edits
〈e1, . . . , ep〉 on a preference profile P , denoted D(P, c, 〈e1, . . . , ep〉), is the non-repeating
sequence of deficit reductions 〈(P1, ei1 , c, d1), . . . , (Pq, eiq , c, dq)〉 of maximum length such
that, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, Pk = P ◦ eij ◦ · · · ◦ eik−1 , Deficit(Pk, c, dk) > Deficit(Pk ◦
eik , c, dk), and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, ij ≤ ik. In more simpler terms, this is the
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sequence of swaps in which candidate c uses to overcome candidate dk in the election.
Each swap made in the sequence should reduce the deficit between them.
From these definitions, we can define the Dodgson election voting rule in terms of
them. Let S be the collection of all sequences of swaps. The Dodgson score of candidate c
in profile P is the smallest p ∈ N such that
(∃〈e1, . . . , ep〉 ∈ S)[Deficit(P ◦ e1 ◦ · · · ◦ ep, c) = 0].
4.2 The Marginal Cost Dodgson Algorithm
Below is the algorithm, emphasizing key components and omitting important but mundane
steps. For instance, the algorithm needs to compute Deficit(P, c). The details of the algo-
rithm will be discussed in the next section. Here, E is a collection of sequences of swaps.
The variable E is implemented as a priority queue, where priority is given to sequences
of edits S ′ that, when applied to the preference profile P , have the fewest edits per deficit
reduction, i.e., that minimize |S ′|/|D(P, c, S ′)|. We call this quantity the marginal cost
of S ′ because it is cost in terms of swaps for making that deficit reduction. We define
|S ′|/|D(P, c, S ′)| =∞ whenever |D(P, c, S ′)| = 0.
For example, Let C = a, b, c, d, e, f , the votes V are arbitrary. Assume c is defeated by
b, d, and e in pairwise elections using the votes in V . In the vote (a  b  d  e  f  c),
to move candidate c to the top would 5 swaps and overtake 2 live candidates, therefore the
marginal cost of this move is 5 / 2 or 2.5. Greedy swaps always have a marginal cost of 1
and will be performed first in the algorithm, since 1 is the lowest marginal cost possible.
S is a list of edits made so far in the algorithm, and let P be a preference profile and c
be a target candidate in the election. The algorithm continues while c is not a Condorcet
winner (meaning that Deficit(P, c), or the total deficit of c against all other candidates, is
greater than 0). For each iteration it chooses the sequence of edits with the least marginal
cost, and if tied for marginal cost, the lowest number of edits, and stores that sequence into
S ′. It then changes the preference profile P to reflect the edits in S ′. Finally, in the loop,
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the edits stored in S ′ are added to S. When the algorithm is finished, it returns the length
of S along with a confidence level. If swaps were used that had marginal costs other than
1, then the confidence level will be maybe, otherwise it will be definitely .
MCDodgsonScore(P, c)
1 S = ∅
2 confidence =“definitely”
3 while Deficit(P, c) > 0
4 do S ′ = argminS′′∈E |S ′′|/|D(P, c, S ′′)|
5 if |S ′|/|D(P, c, S ′)| 6= 1
6 then confidence =“maybe”
7 {e1, . . . , ep} = S ′
8 P = P ◦ e1 ◦ · · · ◦ ep
9 concatenate(S, {e1, . . . , ep})
10 return (|S|, confidence)
Let P be a preference profile and let E ′ be the collection of all swap sequences where,
for each sequence, there is a single voter’s preference list to which all swaps in the sequence
apply. Note then that every such sequence has a distinct last element, so we can represent
each sequence in E ′ by storing its last element only. Let us call the voting system based on
the generic algorithm with E = E ′ “Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson.” The winners are, as
in the Dodgson election, the candidates with the lowest scores.
The above algorithm is both efficient and very frequently correct because it is at least
as frequently correct as GreedyWinner and has a running time of O(N2 logN)
Theorem 8. The running time of Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson, when E = E ′, is
O(N2 logN), where N is the length of the input.
Proof. Let (P, c) be the input to the algorithm, where E = E ′ and P has m candidates and
n voters. We first need to initialize the data structures used. It takes linear time to calculate
Deficit(P, c, d) on all d ∈ C−{c} (note that we can compute Deficit(P, c) at the same
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time). Next we need to initialize E ′. There are at most n(m − 1) sequences S ′ in E ′, and
there are at most m(m− 1)/2 distinct values for |S ′|/|D(P, c, S ′)| that any such sequence
can take. So (regarding E as a priority queue) it takes O(logm) comparisons to add any
such sequence (which we recall is represented by the last element of the sequence) to E .
Note that we can calculate |S ′|/|D(S ′)| for every sequence S ′ in E in a single pass through
P . The worst case is when n is as small as possible, so the worst case running time for
initialization is O(N logN)
After initialization, the algorithm performs swaps on P until c is the Condorcet winner.
Note that any given swap is performed at most once. For each swap applied, the algorithm
must remove the corresponding swap from the queue (since whenever a swap is applied it
follows that the swap sequence ending with that swap has also been applied), and it must
update the marginal cost of each swap sequence remaining in E that applies to the current
voter’s preferences. Thus, every swap may require O(m) updates to E . Assuming that all
swaps in E sharing a common voter are connected via a linked list, each update can happen
in constant time. As during initialization, the worst case for these procedures occurs when
n is as small as possible, so the running time for this part of the algorithm is O(N2)
Finally, every time a swap causes the deficit against some opponent to go from positive
to zero the entire queue needs to be reprioritized, which means we must pass through all
swap sequences and recalculate This can happen at most (m− 1) times. Again, the worst-
case running time is when n is as small as possible, so it is O(N2 logN).
Theorem 9. If GreedyWinner outputs definitely as part of its results, then MCDodgsonWinner
also outputs “definitely” as part of its result.
Proof. Let (C, V, c) be a Dodgson triple where GreedyWinner outputs definitely . If that is
the case, then there must be enough greedy swaps in V with respect to c and the opponents
that are defeating him in order to cover his deficit against each of them. in MCDodgson a
vote cannot have efficiency greater than one (one swap, for one gain, three swaps, for three
gain, etc.) and therefore all greedy swaps will be computed first. In (C, V, c) we know
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that there are enough greedy swaps to cover the deficit because GreedyWinner outputs
“definitely” as part of its result, therefore MCDodgsonWinner will also output definitely .
4.3 MCDodgson’s Approximation Bound
We turn now to the approximation bound. Our proof assumes there is a Condorcet sequence
of swaps witnessing the Dodgson score of c. The following proposition shows that our
assumption is valid. Here, a Condorcet swap sequence means a sequence of swaps that
would make a candidate a Condorcet winner.
Proposition 10. For every preference profile P and candidate c there is a Condorcet swap
sequence of length equal to the Dodgson score of c.
Proof. Let p be the Dodgson score of c and 〈s1, . . . , sp〉 be a Condorcet swap sequence
with respect to candidate c on preference profile P = 〈>1, . . . , >n〉. Let 〈>′1, . . . , >′n〉 =
P ◦ s1 ◦ · · · ◦ sp. Let S be as in the algorithm. Choose i ∈ V and let 〈s′1, . . . , s′q〉 be
the subsequence of 〈s1, . . . , sp〉 consisting of all swaps on voter i’s preferences. Let d′ =
argmaxd∈C:c>′id(d(>i)− c(>i)). Since it requires at least d
′(>i)− c(>i) swaps in order for
c >′i d
′ to hold, it must be the case that |〈s′1, . . . , s′q〉| ≥ d′(>i)− c(>i). So, removing from
S each swap in 〈s′1, . . . , s′q〉 and appending the sequence 〈(i, c(>i) + 1), . . . , (i, d′(>i))〉
yields a Condorcet sequence that has no more swaps than S originally had.
Theorem 11. Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson is an (lnm+1)-approximation of Dodgson
score, where m is the number of candidates in the input election.
Proof. Let P be a preference profile over m candidates and n voters and let c be a candi-
date in {1, . . . ,m}. Let x be the Dodgson score of c on P and let S∗ be a c-normal Con-
dorcet sequence of P . Let y = Deficit(P, c) and let 〈(P ∗1 , c, s∗1, d∗1), . . . , (P ∗y , c, s∗y, d∗y)〉 =
D(P, c, S∗). Let S be the same as in the algorithm on input (P, c) at the time line 11 is
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reached (i.e., it is the sequence of all swaps the algorithm applies to P ), and let
〈(P1, c, s1, d1), . . . , (Py, c, sy, dy)〉 = D(P, c, S).
The basic idea behind our proof is that the number of deficit reductions in a sequence
that witnesses the Dodgson score of c, such as S∗, is equal to the number of deficit reduc-
tions in the sequence S that the algorithm produces. So to compare |S| to |S∗| we partition
the swaps in S (respectively, S∗) among the deficit reductions and then match the deficit
reductions in S to those in S∗. The partitioning is easy: For S it is just the marginal cost
associated with each deficit reduction. For S∗ we fudge the marginal cost in a straightfor-
ward way. The matching and the order in which matched elements are compared are the
trickiest parts of the proof.
For every k ∈ {1, . . . , y}, let r(sk) denote the marginal cost the algorithm associates
with sk (i.e., |S ′|/|D(P, c, S ′)|, where S ′ and P are as in line 5 during the iteration when





Let σ denote a permutation over {1, . . . , y} that satisfies the following constraints.
1. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , y}, d∗j = dσ(j).
2. For every j, k ∈ {1, . . . , y}, if s∗k = sj then k = σ(j).
Clearly, such a mapping exists.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let S∗i (respectively, D∗i ) be the subsequence of all swaps in
S∗ (respectively, 〈s∗1, . . . , s∗y〉) that apply to voter i only (i.e., all swaps that for some j are
of the form (i, j)). Let p = |D∗i | and let Di = 〈sk1 , . . . , skp〉 be the subsequence of all
swaps in 〈s1, . . . , sy〉 that σ maps to some element in D∗i . In particular, this subsequence
preserves the order in which the algorithm applies the swaps.
We claim, for every q ∈ {1, . . . , p}, that r(skq) ≤ |S∗i |/(|D∗i |+ 1− q). This is because,
by our construction of σ, at the time the algorithm is about to choose skq it has not chosen
s∗σ(kq) nor any of the other swaps in S
∗
i that come after it (in fact, the algorithm may not
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have chosen a single swap in S∗i ). Because the subsequence 〈sk1 , . . . , skp〉 preserves the
order in which the swaps were made, the algorithm still needs at this point to close deficits
against the candidates dkq , dkq+1, . . . , dkp (= d∗σ(kq), d
∗
σ(kq+1)
, . . . , d∗σ(kp)).
So at the time the algorithm chooses swap skq , it could instead take the longest subse-
quence of S∗i that remains unchosen. Obviously, this subsequence is at most |S∗i | swaps
long and, as discussed above, it yields at least |D∗i | + 1 − q deficit reductions. Since skq
was chosen as part of a sequence S ′ for which |S ′|/|D(P, S ′, c)| (= r(skq), where P here

















|S∗i |/(m+ 1− q)
≤ |S∗| lnm+ 1
4.4 MCDodgson and Dodgson
Now that we know this is a good approximation of Dodgson elections, we wish to see
which properties of the original system it retains.
Theorem 12. Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson satisfies the Condorcet criterion
Proof. Initially S = ∅, and new elements will only be added to S if the while loop that is
the heart of the algorithm executes. If c is a Condorcet winner, then the deficit against any
other candidate will always be 0 by the definitions of Condorcet winner and deficit. Thus,
the while loop never executes and S remains ∅. Therefore a score of zero is returned and
the algorithm recognizes the candidate as a winner.
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Theorem 13. There exists a preference profile with a candidate c such that c is a Marginal-
Cost-Greedy-Dodgson winner but c is not a Dodgson winner.
Proof. Let C = {a, b, c, d} and let V have four votes:
1. (d  b  c  a)
2. (a  b  c  d)
3. (b  c  d  a)
4. (a  d  b  c)
The Dodgson scores of a, b, c, d are 3, 5, 2, and 3 respectively. The Marginal-Cost-
Greedy-Dodgson scores of the candidates are 2, 4, 2, and 3 respectively. This means that
candidates a and c are Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson winners, but only c is the Dodgson
winner.
Theorem 14. There exists a preference profile with a candidate c such that c is a Dodgson
winner but c is not a Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson winner.
Proof. Let C = {a, b, c, d} and let V have four votes:
1. (c  a  d  b)
2. (b  a  d  c)
3. (d  b  a  c)
4. (c  d  a  b)
The Dodgson scores of a, b, c, d are 3, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. The Marginal-Cost-
Greedy-Dodgson scores of the candidates are 4, 3, 2, and 4 respectively. This means that
candidate b is the only Dodgson winner and the only Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson win-
ner is candidate c.
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4.5 Detail of the Winner and Score Algorithms
Although the winner algorithm as presented earlier is useful in proving theorems it may
not be as useful in implementation. Therefore we present a more detailed version of the
algorithm (including its score component) that a programmer may find easier to translate
into the language of his choice.
Before the actual algorithm, we must define some data structures, types, and simple
functions. Let S be a collection of swaps, and E be a priority queue where swaps of least
marginal cost are considered to have highest priority. Swaps of the same marginal cost are
placed in arbitrary order. We can acces the members of E, along with their priority, by the
notation E[i] which represents the swap in E at position i. Thus E[0] would be the member
of highest priority (or in this case, least marginal cost) along with its marginal cost. Let v[i]
denote the candidate who is in position i in vote v. Position(c, v) is a simple polynomial-
time function which returns an integer representing the position of candidate c in vote v.
Let Swap(c, d, v) be an object representing a swap between candidates c and d in vote v.
Finally, let deficit(c, V ) denote the total deficit of candidate c against other candidates in
the collection of votes V , this is clearly a polynomial-time operation.
The algorithm works by first initializing S to an empty collection of swaps. The main
while loop executes until c no longer has a deficit and is therefore a Condorcet winner.
The main while loop fills the priority queue by computing the marginal cost of all possible
swaps c could make with other candidates. After all marginal costs are computed, only
the swap with the lowest marginal cost is used. That swap is added to our collection of
swaps S, and finally the swap s is carried out on the votes V before the loop returns to the
top where the new, modified version of the votes is used in the computations of the next
iteration.
If we never encounter a marginal cost other than 1, then we know for sure that the
score computed is definitely the Dodgson score. The total length of all the swaps in S is
computed, and then that, along with the confidence measure, is returned.
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MCDodgsonScore(C, V, c)
1 S ← ∅
2 confidence ← “definitely”
3 while deficit(c, V ) > 0
4 do E ← ∅
5 for each v in V
6 pos ← Position(c, v)
7 do D ← candidates that defeat c in pairwise elections
8 counter ← 0
9 for each i in [1, pos) iterated in reverse order
10 do d← v[i]
11 if d ∈ D
12 then counter ← counter + 1
13 marginalcost ← (pos− i)/counter
14 Add Swap(c, d, v) to E with priority marginalcost
15 (s,marginalcost)← E[0]
16 if marginalcost 6= 1
17 then confidence ← “maybe”
18 Add s to S
19 V ← V after making swap s
20 length ← 0
21 for each s in S
22 do length ← length+ the distance between the candidates in swap s
23 return (length, confidence)
The algorithm MCDodgsonWinner simply determines whether the candidate c is the
winner of the Dodgson Election using the MCDodgsonScore algorithm as its scoring mech-




1 cscore ← MCDodgsonScore(C, V, c)
2 for (each d ∈ C−{c})
3 do if MCDodgsonScore(C, V, d) > cscore




Conclusion and Future Research
In this thesis we discussed an approximation for scoring Dodgson elections which uses
and improves upon the technique of the GreedyScore algorithm created by Homan and
Hemaspaandra. Such an approximation algorithm is necessary because the Dodgson score
decision problem falls in the complexity class of NP.
The marginal cost algorithm for computing Dodgson scores is a polynomial-time ap-
proximation. The algorithm is also among the best approximations available for the prob-
lem since it is an (lnm + 1)-approximation of Dodgson score, where m is the number of
candidates in the input election. It was noted that (lnm + 1) is a lower bound on the er-
ror an approximation for Dodgson score can have in [CCF+09] using an observation from
McCabe-Dansted’s thesis [MD06].
This marginal algorithm uses a general framework which could be extended to in-
clude other edit-based election systems (such as Young elections). The algorithm is self-
knowingly correct, but little is known about its exact frequency of correctness other than
that it is at least as frequently correct as the GreedyScore algorithm. The question of the
exact frequency of correctness remains open for further research.
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